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I.
A.

THE PROBLEM

Meanings of "Jurisdiction"

"The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction," Justice
Holmes wrote in 1904, "is not a matter of obvious principle or
of very accurate history."' Although the history has improved
somewhat, 2 the principles remain cloaked in fog. Federal courts,
as they have since the formation of the national government,
exercise power of various sorts-shortly to be explored
here-over cases of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'' Yet
defining that handy phrase still troubles us. True, the other
classifications of cases the district courts hear raise difficult
definitional problems. But those problems seem to be marginal.
No one has any trouble with the basic descriptions: a
"diversity" case starts with parties from different states; a
"federal question" case springs initially from a controversy
regarding some federal law. Although these categories invite one
down a bewildering path of casuistry concerning domicile,
citizenship, and the metaphysics of "arising under," we all know
basically what a diversity case or a federal question case is.
Now try to state the basics of an admiralty case. What is
the quintessence of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? About
all one can honestly say is that the sea or navigable waters have
something to do with it. Something, indeed. The fascination and
the frustration of admiralty as an area of juridical contemplation
is that until one reads treatises, statutes, and cases, one has
nothing but a vague conception of the line which marks the
jurisdictional boundary. No, Virginia, the line is not the three* A.B.. 1953 Harvard; L.L.B.. 1959 Harvard: Professor of Law, Boston College
Law School.
Copyright 1969 by Hiller B. Zobel.
I. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
2. See. e.g.. Putnam, How the Federal courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction.
10 COR.ILL L.Q. 460 (1925).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2; The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77; 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
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mile limit, low tide, or even high tide. A contract to sell the
Oueen Elizabeth is not within admiralty cognizance,' while an
5
injury yards away inside the warehouse is.
I emphasize this point early because I believe people do not
always perceive that "jurisdiction" in the phrase "admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction" means something quite different from
the word in other contexts. For example, the phrase "equity
jurisdiction," as applied to the federal courts since 1938, invites
analysis not of the kinds of cases the courts may hear, but rather
of the kinds of relief which a judge may award to fill certain
fairly well-defined lacunae in the array of common-law remedies.
The merger of law and equity meant merely that, once the court
established the controversy as the sort it was empowered to hear
(on diversity or arising-under grounds) the court could give the
parties whatever relief was coming to them, without regard to
whether the historical source of that relief was the Chancellor or
the jury. The only remaining question was whether the proposed
relief was lawful: The judge might order Wagner not to sing for
Gye, he could not compel her to honor her contract with
Lumley.
To see how different "jurisdiction" in the admiralty sense
is, consider this case: The A Corporation sold a yacht to B,
subsequently furnishing goods and services to the vessel. Upon
B's failure to pay, A proceeded against the vessel in rem in the
local United States District Court. There was no diversity. B's
answer included a counterclaim for damages stemming from
assorted misrepresentations in the original sale. A moved to
dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that because it did not arise
out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject to the
complaint, it was not "compulsory" within Federal Rule 13(a).
If regarded as a permissive counterclaim under Federal Rule
13(b), it lacked an independent jurisdictional ground.'
At this point, the judge was asking himself: Does a court
sitting in admiralty (which phrase I use, somewhat nervously,7 as
4. Grand Banks Fishing Co. v. Styron, 114 F. Supp. I, 2-3 (D. Me. 1953).
5. Casey v. California Stevedore and Ballast Co., 1968 A.M.C. 2721 (N.D. Calif.
1968). See Manson v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. 229 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1964); compare
DiPaola v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 294 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
6. 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice
13.19, at 53-54 (2d ed. 1968).
7. See B. Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U.
CM. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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a convenient shorthand for "a United States District Court
exercising the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States") have the power to determine a dispute over the sale of a
boat? The layman, perhaps even the uninitiate lawyer, might
reasonably assume that vessels are the very core of maritime
matters, and that any controversy concerning a vessel ought
logically to be determinable by the admiralty courts. This
assumption might be strengthened by the realization that the
goods-and-services (which were unquestionably admiralty
matters) had been furnished by the seller of the yacht. The
suggestion is strong that, as is frequently the case ashore as well
as afloat, the dealer and the buyer maintained a service type of
relationship as an almost inevitable consequence of the sale. In
other words, had B not purchased this vessel from A, he might
well have not looked to A for his servicing.
Notwithstanding, the Court, following traditional doctrine,
held: (1) the sale, having preceded the furnishing of goods and
services, could not be said to have "arisen out of" the later
transaction; (2) the counterclaim was therefore permissive; (3)
because the parties lacked diversity, the court could hear the
counterclaim only if there were an independent jurisdictional
ground, namely, admiralty; (4) but suits involving sales of vessels
and breaches of warranty incidental thereto are not cognizable in
admiralty; and (5) therefore, the counterclaim must be
dismissed.'
The case thus illustrates the essential meaning of
"jurisdiction" in an admiralty context. If the dispute does not
fall within a magic category of controversies, the court cannot
even begin to hear the merits, no matter how close a connection
the subject bears to maritime matters generally or to a
transaction concededly within the circle. Some exceptions will
further highlight the illogicality. Suppose the case were this: A
charters a vessel to B for two months with the understanding
that: (1) B will be entirely responsible for the upkeep; (2) B may,
at his own expense, install any equipment he chooses; (3) Upon
termination of the charter, B may purchase the vessel, a portion
of the previously paid charter hire to be applied to the purchase
price. During the charter period, B buys all his supplies and
8. Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. The Yacht Fountainebleau II, 292 F. Supp. 734
(S.D. Fla. 1968).
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materials from A; at A's suggestion, he purchases on credit from
A and has A install an automatic pilot manufactured by A
which will enable him to use the vessel for sport fishing. Upon
expiration of the charter period, B purchases the vessel from A.
A week later, due to A's careless installation of the pilot, the
vessel collides with a tanker. If A commences an action in
admiralty against B for the price of the automatic pilot there will
be no issue as to jurisdiction.'
And if B counterclaims for a breach of warranty on the sale
of the vessel, a breach predicated on the improper installation,
the counterclaim will be denominated compulsory, because it
arose out of the same transaction.' 0 Thus the absence of
admiralty jurisdiction over the boat-sale part of the scenario '
will not prevent the court from hearing the case.
Assume that as a result of the collision, the boat sinks. B
therefore prefers to base his counterclaim upon a tort theory,
viz, that A's faulty installation foreseeably led to the loss of the
boat. Putting aside as presently irrelevant the issues of scope of
the risk and causation, it is almost certain that B's counterclaim,
whether compulsory or permissive for purposes of Federal Rule
13, would be cognizable by the district court. The only issue
2
would be: Did the tort take place on navigable waters?
The confusion into which the sad saga of A and B has plunged
the reader can only partly be blamed on the turgidity of the
description. Cloudiness predominates when one explicates
"admiralty jurisdiction" in terms of the kinds of cases which the
jurisdiction comprehends. Contract disputes are included if they
pertain to maritime subjects; except that some logically
includible contracts (shipbuilding and ship sales) are excluded.
9. The hypothetical is quite different from The Boat La Sambra v. Lewis, 321 F.2d
29 (9th Cir. 1963), where installation preceeded launching. We need not tarry over the
interesting question of whether A has an in rent right against the yacht now, if he
arguably would not have had such a right when he furnished the supplies (a time at which
he owned the boat).
10. Contra. Brown v. Universal Marine Co., 317 F.2d 279, 280 (6th Cir. 19'63),
where the court held that the events underlying the libel did not give rise to the crosslibel.
II. Or over the straight breach of warranty counterclaim, Grand Banks Fishing Co.
v. Styron, 114 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Me. 1953).
12. Arguably, the tort was completed ashore upon manufacture, rather than upon
collision (afloat).
13. A good survey appears in G. GILMORE & C. BLACK. THL LAW O- ADMIRALTY 2426 (1957).
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Torts are included, if one of two conditions are met: (1)the tort
took place-whatever that means-on-whatever that
means-navigable waters-whatever that means; (2) the tort
(even if it took place on land) was caused-whatever that
means-by-whatever that means-a vessel. "
Subject-matter (for contracts) and locality (for torts), are at
least usable touchstones for identifying cases within the
"admiralty jurisdiction." They add nothing, however, to the
definition of the phrase in another common connection. Suppose
the case to be this: A state statute provides that any time a
shipping company fails to properly perform a passage contract,
the disgruntled passenger may obtain state court seizure and sale
of the offending vessel. It is now well-settled that a state may not
confer such in rem powers upon its courts, because to do so
would be giving them "admiralty jurisdiction.' ' 6 Putting the
point this way is not really accurate. The objection to state use
of in rein procedure against vessels is not jurisdictional. After all,
under the familiar saving clause 7 a state may empower its courts
not merely to hear and determine disputes between passengers
and shipowners, but to execute any judgment in a passenger's
favor against the shipowner's property, including his ship. What
the no-state-in-rem rule really means is that a proceeding against
a ship (as opposed to a common-law attachment or execution) is
available only in a court exercising admiralty jurisdiction. A
state may adjudicate the underlying claim in its common-law
courts; it may even create an in rein right for enforcement in the
admiralty court, so long as such creation does not improperly
impair the uniformity of national maritime substantive law."
The final meaning of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"
with which we need concern ourselves springs from this very
issue of uniformity. At the beginning of the Republic, even the
bitterest opponents of a strong national government agreed that
a system of national maritime courts was essential for the
14. Compare Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964) with Wiper
v. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 340 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1965).
15. E.g. Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3rd Cir. 1965)cert. denied. 382
U.S. 938 (1965).
16. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4Wall.) 411 (1866).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
18. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). The current status of
the uniformity rule will be discussed in detail. See text accompanying note 60 et seq hifra.
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encouragement of shipping and international trade. Such a
system, one might argue, necessarily demands a uniform set of
substantive legal principles and a converse denial to the states of
the right to impose their own rules of decision upon those
federally-enunciated principles. It would be convenient for
students and practitioners if over the years the developing
maritime law had been made applicable in any case cognizable in
admiralty, whether the court hearing the given case were a
federal admiralty court, or a federal or state court entertaining
the litigation under the saving clause.
Unfortunately, uniformity was not imposed in cases like
deaths on territorial waters, where admiralty, lacking a remedy
of its own, adopted, in its entirety, the local state wrongful death
statute." In other cases, such as Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co.,"' the Supreme Court, for one reason or
another, found itself able to conclude that the state rule in
question would have no substantial effect on the national fabric
(the so-called "maritime but local" test)' or that the subject was
one which did not require a national rule.2
In the latter instance, the net result was quite close to saying
that: (1) the states will regulate the matter; (2) a district court
hearing the case will apply the rule of the state in which it sits,
and (3) the case is within the admiralty jurisdiction only in the
sense that the court has authority to hear it despite a lack of
diversity (or of the current jurisdictional amount).
In light of the rationale behind the establishment of the
admiralty jurisdiction, 23 it seems to me constitutionally and
statutorily illogical to say that a case is within the admiralty
jurisdiction, concurrent though it may be, and yet subject to the
substantive whims of fifty jurisdictions. Further, the inquiry
which the existence of these exceptions requires sometimes leads
the courts to the kind of unhappy convolutions typified by
Fireman's Fund American Insurance Company v. Boston
Harbor Marina, Inc.,24 which held that an exculpatory contract
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
L. REV.
24.

The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
348 U.S. 310 (1955).
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
348 U.S. at 316.
See, e.g. C. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction:Critique and Suggestions. 50 COLU\,.
259 (1950).
285 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1968), and rev'd, 406 F.2d 917 (Ist Cir. 1969).
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for winter storage and repair-in a terrene hangar-was within
the admiralty jurisdiction and was not one of those transactions
which "are matters of special concern to the states, or reveal
significant differences reflecting deep-dyed local practice,
preference, and public policy.'"'2
Accordingly, the owner of the shore installation was allowed
to escape liability for damage resulting from a fire on the
premises. Without regard to the obvious inconsistency between
this holding and that of Wilburn Boat,2 1 the more recent opinion
seems particularly illogical. What could be of more local interest
than distribution, as between two local citizens, of loss from a
fire in a waterfront building?
B. Equity A drift
1. Did the Woolsack Float?
An unfortunate failure to distinguish between jurisdiction in
its fundamental sense (that is, authority to consider the dispute
in question) and power to administer a given type of relief has
created unnecessary difficulty in defining the place of equity in
admiralty. The classic view of the problem was that admiralty
administered justice on equitable principles, without inordinate
regard to form, but that admiralty lacked any equitable
2"
jurisdiction.
Beginning with Morrison's thoughtful survey in 1933,5 a
line of judges and scholars has clarified the inaccurate
generalities in the classic view. As a result, by 1956, one could
25. 285 F. Supp. at 40. The case also exemplifies the kind of micrometry the
courts are put to in deciding whether a given contract is or is not maritime. Had the
contract called exclusively for winter storage, without repairs, it would have been
considered non-maritime from the start. Id. See the authorities collected in the opinion.
26. 348 U.S. 310.
27. G. RoBiNSON. ADMIRALTY LAW 193 (1939) insisted that admiralty courts "do
not, as equity courts do, dispose of the whole controversy, including its non-maritime
aspects." But 3 BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 108 had said:
Where the admiral's court hath not original jurisdiction of the cause, though
there should arise in it a question that is proper for the cognisance of that court,
yet that doth not alter nor take away the exclusive jurisdiction of the common
law. And so, vice versa, if it hath jurisdiction of the original, it hath also
jurisdiction of all consequantial questions, though properly determinable at
common law.
See also Rigdon v. Hedges, Judge of Admiralty, 88 Eng. Rep. 1295 (K.B. 1699); Ridley
v. Egglesfield, 83 Eng. Rep. 436 (K.B. 1672).
28. Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty., 43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933).
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state the admiralty-equity relationship thus: Once an admiralty
case was properly "in" the district court, the court could apply
any equitable remedies which might be appropriate. However,
before a district court could even consider the appropriateness of
equitable relief, it must be certain that the underlying
controversy was itself a matter within the "admiralty
jurisdiction." A district judge sitting in admiralty could grant
equitable relief by using the reverse of the equitable clean-up
doctrine; but the equity claim must be ancillary or pendant to
the admiralty claim. Thus, although an admiralty court has no
jurisdiction over an action which seeks only to set aside a
fraudulent transfer of a vessel, the court does have power to
inquire into such a transfer if the transfer was sought to deprive
the court of physical jurisdiction over a prospective action in rein
for cargo damage (a matter unquestionably within the admiralty
jurisdiction).29
But what of this case? A and B (citizens of the.same state)
sign a charter party covering A's unique yacht. Before the
charter period commences, B learns that A intends to renounce
the charter and demise the yacht to X. Can B obtain specific
relief in the local United States District Court? Prior to 1966,
the answer would be tolerably clear. B's prayer for equity is not
ancillary to any recognized maritime claim. He is simply asking
an admiralty court to grant merely barebones equitable relief in
a case involving a maritime subject ( a charter party). Therefore,
the case would have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction3
2.

Unification:Solution or Riddle?

In 1966, however, the Supreme Court merged admiralty
libels into that conglomerate "civil action" which heretofore
covered only law and equity. Unification, the distinguished
observers Charles Wright and Leavenworth Colby have
assumed,3 1 eliminated the last barrier to full-dress application of
equitable remedies in admiralty. The courts are not so sure. In
29. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
30. See Rice v. Charles Dreifus Co., 96 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1938). Commercial
Metals Co. v. Int'l Union Marine Corp., 294 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. Colby, Admiralty Unification. 54 GEo. L.J. 1258, 1268-70 (1966); I W. BARRON
AND A. HOLTZOFF. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 32 (Wright ed. 1960).
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Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co.,32
the plaintiff prayed an injunction to compel the defendantshipowner to order a vessel into port. Fortunately, the court was
able to find other grounds than lack of plenary equity power to
deny the relief. Had an alternative basis for the decision not been
available, the judge might have encountered serious difficulty.
Evidence of his uncertainty appears in the footnote to which he
was able to relegate the whole issue. Unification, he said there,
"rendered the continuing effect of this long established doctrine
[i.e., no plenary equity power in admiralty] unclear." Then he
quoted the Note which the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
had appended to the amended Rule 1: "Just as the 1938 rules
abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity, this change would abolish the distinction between civil
actions and suits in admiralty." 3
In Compania de Nevegacione Almirante S.A. Panama v.
Certain Proceeds of Cargo, etc. of the vessel S.S.
Searaven,:I an action for unpaid charter hire, the charterershipper's bank (which had been named as a defendant) was
retaining under an asserted banker's lien the proceeds of the
charterer's drafts on letters of credit issued by the consignees.
The court correctly considered the proceeds as freight standing in
lieu of cargo and thus. subject to a maritime lien.3 5 It then
concluded that "it would be grossly inequitable if the Bank
[which had encouraged the charterer to procure the vessel and
had advanced funds to permit purchase of additional cargo to
avoid dead freight] could avoid the payment of charter hire, i.e.,
reasonable freight.' ""
But enroute to its decision, the court-without even
mentioning the Rules unification-felt constrained to emphasize
that "a Court of Admiralty will not enforce an independent
equitable claim merely because it pertains to maritime
property. ' 17 The court could order the Bank to pay the funds
over only after determining that the shipowner possessed a valid
32. 274 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33. Id. at 20 n.3.
34. 288 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
35. Id. at 79. See N.H. Shipping Corp. v. Freights of the S.S. Jackie Hause, 181 F.
Supp. 165, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
36. 288 F. Supp. at 80.
37. Id. at 81.
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lien on them. Assume a similar dispute, with lack of diversity.
Suppose also that the Bank had disbursed the proceeds before
the shipowner seized them. Could the shipowner have obtained
an accounting? The entire tenor of the court's opinion indicates
it could not; that would be the sort of "independent equitable
claim" which admiralty, in the opinion's language, will not
enforce.
Thus I must diffidently demur from the Colby-Wright
assumption; or, since demurrers are out of fashion, file what in
the good old days of admiralty might be called exceptive
allegations. Apart from whatever weight the judicial uncertainty
portends, I believe there are valid arguments against assuming
that the Revolution of 1966 worked so complete a change as my
betters have suggested.
a. The Possible.
The absence of plenary power to grant barebones equitable
relief was a deeply-rooted rule of admiralty jurisprudence.
Emphatic language by Judge Learned Hand and Justice
Frankfurter makes that clear."8 The latter's position is
particularly significant because he voiced it in the course of an
opinion otherwise devoted to showing how silly it was for anyone
to doubt that admiralty had ancillary equity power. I will note
en passant, without undue emphasis, that the Hand-Frankfurter
position comes close to conceding not merely the lack of plenary
equity power, but the constitutional impossibility of giving that
power to a district judge deciding an admiralty case. Even if we
assume for the moment that such a change can indeed be
effected, we still have to consider just how the change is to come
about. Only three possibilities present themselves: (1) judicial fiat;
(2) legislative enactment; or, more likely, (3) a combination of
the two. The legal history of this country, from Story's day to
the present, reveals that the contours of admiralty are
changeable, and that no one is really certain whether the ultimate
boundary-making power rests on Capitol Hill or across town.
One example will sufficiently illustrate the point. Originally,
mortgages on ships (as opposed to such money-raising
obsolescences as bottomry bonds) were not enforceable in
38. Rice v. Charles Dreifus Co., 96 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1938), Swift & Co. Packers
v. Compania Columbiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 690 (1950).
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admiralty. 9 In 1929, Congress passed a statute which openly
authorized the district courts sitting in admiralty to foreclose
such mortgages. 0
In due course, a case involving the Ship Mortgage Act
reached the Supreme Court, raising, as any similar controversy
would, the following paradox: If power to change the admiralty
jurisdiction reposes basically in the Court, then Congress cannot
constitutionally alter the jurisdiction; if such power rests with
Congress, then the Court (a) should not attempt to define the
jurisdiction and (b) cannot overturn any admiralty jurisdiction
statute absent some non-maritime reason such as lack of due
process. The Court squarely faced the paradox and swallowed it
whole: Congress, said Chief Justice Hughes, "has paramount
power to determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country . . . . But in amending and revising the
maritime law, the Congress necessarily acts within a sphere
restricted by the concept of the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," a concept, it need hardly be added, which would be
defined by the Supreme Court."
Although a subservient paramountcy may offer inviting
fields for theological speculation, it will not draw much applause
for jurisprudential certainty. Perhaps we ought to comfort
ourselves by noting that ordinarily, identification of the final
maritime nay-sayer makes little difference. The last time the
problem arose-with the Admiralty Extension Act, 2 which
corrected a salt-encrusted anomaly43 and brought into the
admiralty jurisdiction any damage caused by a vessel, even if the
damage occurred ashore-the Court did not bother to identify
the difficulty. In fact, it did not even trouble to consider the Act
directly. Holding that a longshoreman's case was within the
admiralty jurisdiction when he slipped on loose beans on the
dock, Justice White casually observed that "the case is within
the maritime jurisdiction under [the Act],"" and went on to
other things.
Bogart v. The S.S. John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854).
46 U.S.C. § 951 (1964).
Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934).
46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
43. G. ROBINSON. supra note 27, at 50.
44. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963).

39.
40.
41.
42.
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b. Does Admiralt' Live?
Although the paradox does not usually cause serious
trouble, the admiralty-equity problem does seem to require that
the puzzle be re-examined. The Rules merger went forward under
two sections of the Judicial Code. Section 2072, dealing with
civil-rule promulgation, says that the Rules "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.' ' 5 Section 2073, dealing
with admiralty rules, says: "Such rules shall not abridge or
modify any substantive right."' 6
I confess myself baffled at the omission from section 2073
of the verb "enlarge." Possibly, this meant that Congress
intended the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, to be able to enlarge admiralty rights, but not legal or
equitable ones. Are we then to assume that the unified Rules,
insofar as they affect admiralty and maritime cases (and of
course I am not here talking about the pure admiralty
Supplemental Rules)17 are "admiralty" rules? If so, does that
not prove too much, viz, that there is still such a juridical entity
as admiralty, which is somehow administered in a different way
from law-and-equity? Although as an old admiralty practioner, I
would be pleased to keep the silver oar polished, it seems to me
more sensible to assume that the verb "modify" sufficiently
covers the problem at hand. If, solely as a result of the merger,
our yacht-chartering friend B can obtain the specific performance
which before 1966 he could have received only in a state court,
his rights, and perhaps those of A, have been modified, within
the meaning of either section 2072 or. section 2073. Because the
statute proscribes such modification, unification must not be
taken to have given admiralty a plenary equity power. This
reasoning, I hasten to add, is not inexorable. Shortly after
merger, the First Circuit faced the following, in Hansen v.
Trawler Snoopy, Inc.:'8 The losing party in a limitation of
liability proceeding filed his appeal seventy days after judgment,
relying on section 2107 of the Judicial Code' which read: "In
any action, suit or proceeding in admiralty, the notice of appeal
45.
46.
Nov. 6.
47.
48.
49.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 2073 has since been repealed as superfluous. Pub. L. 89-773. § 2,
1966, 80 Stat. 1323, [1966] U.S. Code Cong. I4hn. Avews 1546, 4175.
Fi. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rules A-F.
384 1'.2d 131 (Ist Cir. 1967).
28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1964).

1969]

THE AMERICAN LA W INSTITUTE

shall be filed within ninety days after the entry of the order,
judgment, or decree appealed from." 5'
Federal Rule 73(a) allows thirty days, enlargeable to sixty
days. Which should control, the Rule or the statute? It hinged on
whether admiralty is still admiralty, and on whether the merger
"abridge[d] any substantive right." One can hardly disagree with
the court's conclusion that a filing deadline is not substantive at
all, and hence that the saving language of either section 2072 or
section 2073 did not apply. But if there is anything left of a
conceptually separate admiralty, then surely section 2107 should
control. After all, this was no saving-clause action, fortuitiously
brought "in admiralty." It was a limitation proceeding, which
even after unification must still be governed by the "admiralty"
Supplemental Rules.' In short, if ever there could be an
"admiralty" action, this was it. Undaunted, the Court, per
curial?, dismissed the appeal, citing the omnibus erasive
language of both section 2072 and section 2073: "As of [the]
date [that] the revised civil rules became effective . . . all laws in
'5 2
conflict with them became ineffective."
The short opinion does not discuss the point, so one cannot
tell whether the court concluded that "admiralty" cases no
longer exist, except as the Rules, numbered as well as lettered,
may recognize them; or whether, on the other hand, the problem
passed unperceived.
Whatever the reason, the result seems wrong. If either
Congress or the Supreme Court meant unification to signal
recognition that we need no longer afford admiralty cases-as
the word is used in both the Rules and the statutes- different
treatment on appeal, then one or the other should have said so.
The idea of effecting major changes in the handling of judicial
business merely by allowing proposed rules to lie on Congress'
table for ninety days5:1 is, to say the least, unwise; and moreover,
unfair. Resolving the inevitable interpretive problems in advance
by abrogating "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules" puts a
litigant in dire peril if his attorney happens to guess wrong about
50. Id.
51. Ft:D. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rule 1-%
52. 384 F.2d at 132. The problem would not arise today. Fm). R. Civ. P. 73 has
been superseded by HIt). R. AP . P. 4(a), which carefully defines "civil case" to include
.,a civil action which involves an admiralty or maritime claim."
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075 (1964).
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the existence of a conflict between statute and rule. And, because
"laws" clearly includes decisions,5' the lawyer must guess if the
Supreme Court, without brief, argument, or consideration, has
overruled every decision which may "conflict" with one of the
new or revised Rules.
A careless assumption that for all purposes unification
automatically converted "admiralty" actions into "civil" actions
can create even more serious problems. The well-known Rules of
Decision Act 55 now prescribes that: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.""6 If "civil actions"
merely represents the plural of the phrase in Rule 257 then
perhaps unwittingly unification has brought the Erie doctrine
into maritime litigation.' 8 If, as the Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 1 says, unification "would abolish the distinction
between civil actions and suits in admiralty," 5 ' presumably all
statutory language using the words "civil action" now applies to
what weused to call admiralty. I am afraid it will not do merely
to dismiss the possibility as preposterous. The Erie doctrine itself
may rest on constitutional grounds; the doctrine of maritime-law
uniformity does not."' Justice Holmes, as one unsympathetic
observer noted, found
in the saving clause a contemporaneous interpretation of the
Constitution to the effect that except as to one institution,
proceedings to enforce a maritime lien, the states had not
only concurrent jurisdiction but power to apply whatever law
they wished in the exercise thereof.6'
Nothing would prevent Congress from requiring all maritime
matters (except perhaps in rem procedure) to be determined by
54. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
56. Id.
57, FED. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action'."
58. Qy. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. I, Advisory Committee's Note (1966).
60. 304 U.S. at 77-78 (1938); see authorities cited in Stevens, Erie R.R, v.
Tompkins and the Unijorm General Maritime Law. 64 HARV,. L. REv. 246, 251-52
(1950). Stevens himself takes the opposite view. See also Deutsch, Development oJ the
Theory of .4dmiraltyJurisdictionin the United States, 35 TUL. L. REv. 117, 128 (1960).
61. Wright, Lnijormit." in the Maritine Law oJ the United States. 73 U. PA. L.
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state law. This is particularly true in saving-clause cases. In fact,
one of the earliest authoritative interpretations of the savingclause insisted that the clause "has made a distinction between
common and other law most material; for as the party 'in all
cases,' is entitled to his common law remedy wherever it may be
had; where this can be had, no other can be safely pursued. '6 2
If uniformity in maritime cases is not constitutionally
required, and Congress may therefore legislate a positive
abrogation of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen" and Pope &
Talbot Inc. v. Hawn,6 who is to say that Congress' approval of
the "civilactionizing" Rules did not work just such a change?
Surely not those who believe, for example, that unification ex
proprio vigore give admiralty plenary equity power; surely not
the judges, for another example, who decided that unification
automatically erased the "admiralty" appeal provisions of
section 2107.
The best argument against my suggestion is the last phrase
of section 1652: "in cases where they apply."65 Those words
could be interpreted to mean "except in cases where up to now
the federal courts have used federal law as the rules of decision."
But such a reading, while indeed plausible, flies in the teeth of
the semantic equivalence between statute and rule: both refer to
"civil action(s)." Further, the phrase, without the comma
preceding, was part of the original Judiciary Act. 6
Although state decisions, for almost one hundred years, had
been held not to "apply" in diversity cases, the Court in Erie
had no difficulty deciding that henceforth, they should indeed
control such litigation. That is to say, it is the Court (and a
Jbrtiori Congress) which decides the circumstances under which
123, 223, 234 (1925), citing The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 406 (1907). See also
Holmes' dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 223 (1917).
62. 6 N. DANE, ABRIDGMENT 353 (1823). The view that maritime-law uniformity is
'designed to insure that litigants with the same kind of case have their rights measured
REv.

by the same legal standards of liability' ", Friendly, In Praise oJ Erie-and of the New
Federal Coninion Law. 19 RECORD, Assoc. BAR, CITY OF Ni~w YORK 64, 79 (1964),
quoting Black, J. in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn. 346 U.S. 406, 410 (1954), assumes its

own conclusion. Is a saving clause controversy in the state court "the same kind of case"
as either (I) a maritime diversity action in the federal court or (2) an admiralty action?
63. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).

64. 346 U.S. 406 (1954).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
66. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
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state decisions "apply." What Erie gave to the states in diversity
actions, unification could give them in maritime matters.
Congress does have that power.
Even the oracle of uniformity, Justice McReynolds, admitted
that it was only "in the absence of some controlling statute"
that "the general maritime law, as accepted by the Federal
courts, constitutes part of our national law." ' 7 The question now
is simply whether Congress has, unwittingly perhaps, overturned
a line of judicial decisions. Once again until a court produces an
apposite, opposite, opinion, the answer must remain doubtful.
The final argument against the idea that unification-curnsection 1652 abolished federal maritime-law supremacy is simply
that the whole chimera is unthinkable. It certainly is. But then so
was the idea in 1791 that a citizen could sue a state, even though

the Constitution"' and a statut& both gave the federal courts
jurisdiction over suits between "a state and citizens of another
state." Most lawyers of the time probably felt that they could
not rationally believe either the framers or the Congress to have
intended such an impossible result. Nonetheless that is precisely

what the words in question said, and allowed;70 and it took the
7
eleventh amendment to set matters right again. '
3.

Can The ChancellorSail?

Thus, by a natural process of indignation, we return to the
yacht sale between A and B. If either Congress, the courts, or
both can enlarge the jurisdictional description of admiralty cases
to include maritime matters praying bare, nonanciallary
67. 244 U.S. at 215 (1917).
68. U.S. CONST. art. IIf. § 2.
69. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, I Stat. 80.
70. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 363 (1793).
71. This paper is already so discursive that I must with regret eschew another
admiralty-inspired construction puzzle: Can a citizen of New York bring a federal action
in rent against a motorboat owned by the state of Massachusetts? Clearly, no in
179 U.S. 552 (1900), nor even a quasi-in
personam action, Workman v. Aew York Cityr.
personami action, In re oJ the State oJ New York. 256 U.S. 490 (1921). Ex parte
Madrazzo. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 395 (1833), will lie; those are too close to the eleventh
amendment's prohibition of actions "inlaw or equity". But what of a proceeding against
a thing, albeit a thing owned by a state? The Supreme Court does not seem ever to have
ruled on this. Perhaps the state by engaging in maritime commerce could be considered
to have surrendered its sovereignty "pro tanto and pro tempore". Chesapeake Bay
Bridge and Tunnel District v. Lauritzen. 404 1.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1968). What law
applies, state or Federal? See In re M/T Alva Cape, 405 F.2d 962. 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
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equitable relief, 72 and if such an enlargement would pass
constitutional muster,73 then it seems reasonable to ask that we
receive along those lines at least a positive inkling either
statutory or decisional. Instead, all we have so far is continuing
Congressional silence, and from the Supreme Court this:
"Unquestionably a court of admiralty will not enforce an
independent equitable claim merely because it pertains to
74
maritime property.
To compound the confusion, on its facts, Swift & Co.,
Packers v. Conipania Transmaritima Columnbiana75 could be
read as attributing plenary equity power to admiralty. The action
was in personam for nondelivery of cargo shipped on the M/V
Cali, which had sunk. A few days before the libel was filed, the
respondent (former owner of the Cali) transferred to a dummy
corporation another vessel, the Alacran. Upon filing of the libel,
the libelants prayed and obtained attachment of the Alacran
under an admiralty process known as writ of foreign attachment,
whereby attachment of an absent respondent's chattels (including
any vessel not involved in the controversy) confers personal
jurisdiction. 7 The dummy transferee opposed the attachment
(and thus the personal jurisdiction) on the plausible ground that
the Alacran was not respondent's property 7 7 Thus as the case
came to the Supreme Court, if admiralty lacked jurisdiction (i.e.,
authority) to set aside the transfer, the respondent would never
be properly before the court. Therefore, the issue of the
fraudulent transfer, far from being ancillary or subsidiary to any
admiralty issue, was rather precedent to it. If the district court
could not negate the transfer, the court would have had no
defendant against which to exercise its undoubted power to
resolve the underlying cargo dispute. This seems very close to
giving admiralty barebones equity jurisdiction. But the tenor of
72. Morrison, supra note 28, at 32-33.
73. See Rice v. Charles Dreifus Co., 96 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand. J.).
74. Swift &. Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 690
(1950) (Frankfurter J.).
75. 83 F. Supp. 273 (D.C.Z. 1948), affid. 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd. 339
U.S. 684 (1950).
76. See 2 BENEDICT. ADMIRALTY 352-53 (6th ed. 1940): National Shipping &
Trading Corp. v. Weeks Stevedoring Co., 252 F. Supp. 275, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
SUPREME COURT ADMIRALTY RULE 2. The practice survived unification"See FED. R. Civ.
P. Supplemental Rule B.
77. See 83 F. Supp. 273 (D.C.Z. 1948), aJJd. 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd.
339 U.S. 684 (1950). The original attachment was dissolved and a second obtained. This is
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the opinion, as well as much of its language, go directly the
other way. I know of no case-nor even a commentary- which
has read Swift as authorizing full equity powers.
A feeling that my suggested reading of Swift is in every
sense academic is strengthened by Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v.
Seafairers' International Union. 8 Enraged at the blacklisting of
American ships by the United Arab Republic, two unions
established picket lines near the SS Cleopatra, thus preventing
handling of her cargo. The shipowner sought federal relief. Its
complaint did not allege diversity, although diversity existed."
Federal jurisdiction was asserted on three grounds: (1) an antitrust violation;" ' (2) a tort against an alien violating international
law; 81 and (3) a maritime tort.12 Finding no substance to any of
these, the court dismissed the action.
Chief Judge Lumbard and Judges Moore and Friendly
decided per curiarn that a district judge sitting in admiralty
could not enjoin a maritime tort. Because the court assumed that
the tort ("picketing which prevents a vessel's being unloaded
when the owner is powerless to take action that will end the
picketing [a tort whose] effect was felt on the navigable waters of
New York harbor where the cargo continued to be held
. . .. ,,)3 was indeed maritime, the case seems analytically
similar to Swift. In both, the equitable relief is related to a
controversy indubitably maritime: cargo loss in one instance,
maritime tort in the other. Khedivial Line did not cite Swift; and
it expressly declined to consider whether the injunctive relief
might be made "pendent" to a related federal claim, since it
determined that no such claim existed.'
Failure of the complaint to allege diversity permitted the
court to avoid an interesting problem: If a case is maritime, but
"saved" for disposition at plaintiff's option in a non-admiralty
court, the controlling substantive principles remain maritime.
proof that the only source of personal jurisdiction was the second attachment, since if
respondent had answered before the second attachment was made, the appearance would
have nullified the attachment. See BENEDICT. supa note 76, at 352.
78. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
80. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1964).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1964).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
83. 278 F.2d at 52.
84. Id. at 53.
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That is, even when the plaintiff resorts to a state writ, the state
judge will follow federally-enunciated maritime rules. s Should
the case be brought in the federal court, but not in admiralty, the
court will likewise take its law from federal decisions; the Erie
doctrine does not apply.,
Suppose the Khedivial Line had brought a diversity action
seeking to enjoin the Union's commission of a maritime tort.
(Observe that the Second Circuit specifically held that antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act 7 did not
apply; the Union's feelings about Nasser did not constitute "'a
labor dispute.")," Could the court then have granted an
injunction? Clearly, yes. The court has subject matter jurisdiction
and the remedy is one the court is competent to give. But what if
any effect does the saving clause have? I think none. Either the
matter is within the maritime jurisdiction or it is not. If it is
(which the opinion unequivocably denies), then certainly the
remedy involved is one to which the plaintiff is "otherwise," i.e.,
elsewhere, "entitled."," If the matter is outside the maritime
jurisdiction, then it is neither "saved" nor "savable.'' "
Regardless of the saving clause, the plaintiff seeking an
injunction against a maritime tort, or the plaintiff (like the
disappointed charterer, B) seeking specific performance, may
proceed in the state court' or, if diversity requirements are met,
in the federal court.
The saving clause issue is more significant in the next phase
of the problem. What law does the non-admiralty court apply? If
the matter were savably within the maritime jurisdiction, a
federally-enunciated maritime law would control, 2 because a
saving-clause case is still maritime. But if, as the Khedivial
Line opinion holds, admiralty has no jurisidiction over an
application to enjoin a maritime tort, then the controversy is no
longer maritime. The state court may apply whatever substantive
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
(1900).
92.

Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
Id.
29U.S.C.§§ 101-15(1964).
278 F.2d at 50.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
G. GiLMORE & C. BtCK, supra note 13, at 34.
The Knapp, Stout, & Co. Company v. McCaffrey,
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).

177 U.S. 638. 644-47
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rule it chooses; the federal court (if the case were brought there
on diversity grounds) would likewise apply state lawY
By denying the admiralty court power to grant barebones
equitable relief to a suitor, Khedivial Line, like Swift, expells
cases involving application for such relief from maritime
jurisdiction entirely. Khedivial Line thus relegates to the control
of the states a range of subjects which logic and common sense
might well suggest should be considered nationally. If uniformity in marine matters has any viability at all, surely it
requires that the scope of permissible interference with
international cargo operations be defined by the federal courts,
not the statesY4
If the no-barebones-equity rule is to be changed, as indeed it
ought to be, one effect will be an increase in the number of nondiversity cases triable in federal courts. All the equity cases
which are presently outside the admiralty jurisdiction", will be
swept within it. I mention this not from a morbid interest in
docket-clogging, but rather to emphasize in an additional context
the unlikelihood of Congress' having intended to allow the 1966
merger to work such a significant jurisdictional change, meaning
a change in the types and numbers of cases the federal courts can
hear. Moreover, by making people like the picketing sailors and
longshoremen in Khedivial Line amenable to injunctions
obtained by co-citizens, such a change would work a clear
modification of a substantive right, in flat violation of the
Congressional intent so clearly expressed in the Rules Revision
Act." Mere desirability of a change does authorize anticipating
its arrival. I say again, before we can be sure that a federal court
will grant barebones equitable relief in a case not involving
diversity or a federal question, Congress or the Supreme Court
will have to tell us so directly.
Of course, even if I am correct in believing that unification
did not automatically install plenary equity power in admiralty, I
may still be incorrect in regarding the deficiency as
jurisdictional. It may be that a complaint by someone like the
93. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94. But see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.. 348 U.S. 310
(1955).
95. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 34.

96. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073 (1964).

1969]

THE AMERICAN LA W INSTITUTE

yacht-charterer, seeking specific performance, is defective simply
because it fails to state a claim upon which the court can grant
relief?7
This assumes, I think, that the case is similar to a diversity
action in which the plaintiff alleges merely that the defendant
winked at him. The B v. A matter seems more comparable to a
diversity case dismissed for lack of the jurisdictional amount. If
a court is asked to hear a marine-related claim lacking not
merely an admiralty jurisdictional basis, but any other type of
jurisdictional basis, only in a punning sense may the case be said
to fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In every
other respect, the case is simply beyond the court's power to
adjudicate.
II.
A.

THE PROPOSAL

The Statute

It is of course much easier to criticize the present state of
admiralty jurisdiction and remedies than to explain them; and it
is even easier to criticize ameliorating legislation than to draft it.
Still, candor compels the reluctant conclusion that the Admiralty
portion of the recently-completed American Law Institute Study
of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Court s is unnecessarily incomplete and innovative. In light of
the serious need for a comprehensive rationalization of the
tangled juridical seine, the Devil's Own Mess, the shortcomings in the Study are indeed cause for sadness? 9
The ALI scheme may be briefly stated:
1. It deliberately avoids setting guidelines, except for a
partial disclaimer of the locality test for torts.
2. The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction only in: (1)
limitation proceedings; (2) actions against the United States
under the Public Vessels and Suits in Admiralty Acts;'"" (3) actions in rein either arising under the general maritime law or to
enforce Congressional or state-created maritime liens.
3. A maritime case commenced in a state court, if it meets
diversity or "arising under" criteria, or if the United States is a
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
98. ALl. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
COURTS §§ 1316-19 at 34-37, 225-54 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALl STUDY].
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defendant, may be removed (presumably by the defendant), If the
case is one of exclusive maritime jurisdiction, it may be removed
"by any party."
4. Venue lies where "a substantial part" of the underlying
transaction took place or where the defendant or his property
may be found. In personam service of "process may be made
nationwide; in rein attachment only in the district of suit. Interdistrict transfers are liberally permitted.
5. In any action in personam for "money damage for
personal injuries or death," except limitation proceedings and
actions against the United States, either party may request a
jury. In any other actions (presumably including in rein actions)
in which diversity or arising-under requirements are met, the
parties, it seems, may likewise request a jury.
Before proceeding to a critique of the Study, it may be
helpful to emphasize some matters which it omits to cover, or
covers inadequately:
1. There is no useful indication of the boundaries of
admiralty jurisdiction, either in tort or in contract.
2. The "equity" problem is untouched.
3. The position of state law in the resolution of maritime
disputes is insufficiently worked out.
4. The right to jury trial is likewise inadequately
rationalized.
B. Jurisdiction:The Fog Remains

This bill of particulars, it is apparent, expresses my strong
feeling that the entire question of the admiralty jurisdiction badly
needs statutory appraisal, and that the ALl revision did not
begin to fill that need. The decision to treat "admiralty and
maritime cases in a separate chapter""" ought to have
committed the Study to a comprehensive review of admiralty's
jurisdictional contours. Instead, the Institute talked itself into
99. With appropriate recognition to Note, The Tangled Seine: .4 Surveti ol
Maritine Personal Injury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243 (1947), and D. Currie. Federalisn
and the Adnziraltr: "'The Devil's Own Mess." 1960 Sup. CT. Ri;V. 158. Professor
Currie does not share my disapproval of what the ALl has done to admiralty. D.
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part II), 36 U. CIII. L. R] %.
268, 286-89 (1969).
100. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964); 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52.
101. ALl STUDY at 226.
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simultaneously overstating the complexity of the task and
underestimating its significance.
For example, faced with a physical situation which would
sweep into the admiralty jurisdiction pleasure boats as well as
cargo liners, the Institute gave up before it fairly began:
It would be difficult to draft the jurisdictional statute in such
a way as to exclude pleasure boating, and problems would
arise in deciding what is a pleasure boat and what the
jurisdictional consequences are of a collision between a
pleasure boat and a commercial vessel. 2
The difficulty thus described seems more apparent than real.
An admiralty-jurisdiction statute could well be drawn in tonnage
terms ("no vessel smaller than X tons will be considered within
the jurisdiction for tort purposes," or, if you prefer, "for any
purpose"). The yacht-freighter collision could be disposed of
equally simply by a clause placing any such collision within the
admiralty jurisdiction. A precedent for making half-admiralty
collisions wholly justiciable in admiralty already exists: the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act." 3
The Study shrinks from tasks which are the essence of
jurisdictional definition. For instance: "Whether a pleasure boat
should be regarded as a vessel for purposes of the Limitation of
Liability Act . . . is hardly the sort of question a jurisdictional
study can appropriately resolve."'" 4 With all respect, I believe
that this is precisely the sort of question a jurisdictional revision
must answer. Deciding what constitutes a vessel delimits pro
tanto the contours of the admiralty jurisdiction. It is what the
courts do now; there is no reason why a statute cannot or should
not take over the task. Obviously, questions will remain for
judicial resolution. The impossibility of producing a dictionary
should not preclude an attempt at formulating a working
glossary.
Recognizing the messy state of the jurisdictional lines as
they have been illogically drawn by the courts, the ALl Study
dismisses the irrationality as "of little practical significance . ..
since so long as it is understood, as it is, by those who build
102. Id. at 227.
103. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
104. Id. at 227-28.
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ships and those for whom they are built, they are able to
safeguard their interests.' 1 °5 And a little later: "The gloss that
time has created on the traditional words may be puzzling to the
neophyte, but it is well understood by the specialized bar and
experienced judges who try admiralty cases."""
This is an unfortunate attitude. The entire thrust of modern
law reform, as exemplified by the Federal Rules, has been away
from the mumbo-jumbo theory of law practice. Some years ago,
the late Professor Brainerd Currie, chief moral architect of the
Rules unification, wrote that "the admiralty practice needs to be
modernized and to be stated so that all may know it ....
[Through unification] the mystery of that practice will have been
'0 7
largely dissipated.'
The Institute's position is a direct refutation of this
philosophy. Either the jurisdictional aspects of admiralty are
confused and arcane, in which case we had best take every
opportunity to clarify them; or they are not, in which case we
ought to stop treating them like latter-day mysteries of the Bona
Dea. To say that an important branch of federal jurisdiction is
to be left in a statutory fog simply because clearing the fog is
difficult and because experienced legal hands know how to
navigate without radar is, I submit, unfortunate.
What compounds the poignacy of the Institute's decision is
the Reporters' clear realization that the entire problem could be
largely resolved by saying:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extends to and
includes all claims arising out of any maritime transaction or
occurrence irrespective of where the claim arose or the
damage or injury occurred.Y'1
But they spurned this solution because the "additional language,
while helping on old problems, might well give rise to new
ones."°109
This again seems to be responsibility-ducking. Any statute
gives rise to problems of interpretation. But the self-rejected
105. Id. at 228.
106. Id. at 230.
107. B. Currie, Uniication ol the Civil and Admiralty Rules: WhY and low. 17
U. Mi-. L. RFv. 1, 13, 14 (1965).
108. ALl STt;Dy 230.
109. Id. at 231.
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proposal, if coupled with language to indicate that "maritime
transaction or occurrence" includes any contract for sale,
construction, or service involving equipment used in marine
commerce, would greatly clarify the jurisdictional boundaries in
both tort and contract.
Ironically, the Institute did not feel similarly restricted in
altering traditional tort jurisdiction. By saying that the admiralty
jurisdiction "does not include a claim merely because it arose on
navigable waters,"' 10 the Institute commendably eliminated what
was left of the so-called strict locality test for tort jurisdiction."'
Why did not the Institute similarly polish off some of the
obfuscations in the contract jurisdiction? Even the "specialized
bar" argument fails here. Presumably the- most venerable
member of the Maritime Law Association would be unable to
explain why, for example, sales of vessels are outside the
admiralty jurisdiction.
Equity: An Incomplete Assumption
In light of the uncertainty which has persisted despite
merger, any revision of admiralty jurisdiction ought fairly to
have faced the equity question. The Commentary, while
recognizing the problem as jurisdictional, goes on to say that
"today there should be no difficulty in a federal court [sic]
giving equitable relief in a case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction.""12
C.

The only case cited to support this assumption is Guillot v.
Cenac Towing Co.,113 in which Judge John R. Brown (the most
authoritative maritime analyst in all the federal judiciary) said:
"In the Admiralty the Chancellor now goes to sea and has
equitable reserves.""' Because Judge Brown cited only Swift and
because the question at bar concerned only the court's power to
110. Id. at 34.
IlI. The change is desirable, although the cases the COMMENTARY relies on to
indicate the courts' willingness to abandon the test are not so conclusive as might first appear. In both McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and
Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), the injury
resulted from contact with the bottom (or an object affixed thereto); arguably, therefore,
the injury was not within the admiralty jurisdiction. Compare Hastings v. Mann, 340
F.2d 910, 912 (4th Cir. 1965) (erroneously cited in ALl STUDY at 230 as involving
.. wharfage services") with Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Florida, 251 F. Supp.
327, 328 (M.D. Fla. 1965) (swimmer struck by surfboard is within admiralty jurisdiction).
112. ALl STUDY at 227.
113. 366 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1966).
114. Id. at 904. For an even earlier (and equally colorful) assertion by Judge Brown
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issue injunctions in a limitation proceeding, the opinion hardly
stands for a declaration of plenary equity power in admiralty.
The case, like the Institute's assumption itself, does not apply to
the soured charter party case we considered earlier. Naturally,
since the point was unnecessary to its decision, the court did not
consider the problem of power to grant equitable relief when
such relief is itself the entire controversy. The Institute on the
other hand, did not consider it because the Study consciously
avoided the kind of jurisdictional overhaul that would have been
required before the problem could even be approached. In order
to allow a district judge to grant specific performance in a
breach of charter-party case, where money damages are
inadequate, someone (Congress or Court) must say that
whenever a case involves maritime property, or a maritime
transaction of a genre normally within the admiralty jurisdiction
(e.g., ,,
charter parties), the court can grant equitable relief
without first assuring itself that the controversy requiring such
relief is the sort ordinarily justiciable in admiralty. In other
words, despite unification, we still lack a binding announcement
that in admiralty cases equity need no longer be ancillary. Judge
Brown himself has come close to enunciating such a rule, in a
case, oddly enough, decided in 1961, long before unification,
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A.._1 5 concerned a dispute over a
contract for the managing agency of a vessel. In the course of
deciding that the controversy came within the admiralty
jurisdiction, Judge Brown had occasion to discuss Archawski v.
Haniott1 6 in which the Supreme Court had upheld admiralty
jurisdiction over an effort by passengers to recover from a
shipowner, on an unjust-enrichment theory, moneys paid for
passage on a voyage which had been abandoned. Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas had said: "[S]o long as the claim
asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court
has jurisdiction over it."1 7 But the context clearly indicated that
the real basis for admiralty jurisdiction was the Court's belief
"that duty to pay is often referable, as here, to the breach of a
maritime contract. " 8 Judge Brown, however, read Archawski
of the same point, see Compania Anonima Venezolana v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303
F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1962); the case however, involved an equitable defense, which had
always been permissible. See Rice v. Charles Dreifus Co., 96 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1938).
115. 290 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1961).
116. 350 U.S. 532 (1956).
117. Id. at 535.
118. Id. at 534.
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much more expansively: "The test there announced," he said,
"was the broad one of the inherent maritime character of the
underlying transaction.""'
The Fifth Circuit, in a case decided just about the time
merger became effective, 20 carried Judge Brown's reading of
Archawski a step forward, rejecting the argument that a suit to
reform a ship mortgage would not be within the admiralty.'
Nonetheless, as if to illustrate the uncertainty which still
permeates this branch of admiralty, the court relied only upon
Archawski, Hadjipateras, and surprisingly enough, Swift,i' 22 in
which Justice Frankfurter had carefully limited admiralty's
equity powers to "subsidiary" relief.' The Fifth Circuit did not
even cite, much less distinguish, Learned Hand's strong assertion
in Rice v. Charles Dreifiis Co.:'2 1 "It is true, no doubt, that the
admiralty has no jurisdiction over a libel to reform a written
instrument. ' 125 With the authorities in such evident disarray, it
seems incumbent upon a statutory jurisdictional revision to
resolve the problem definitively. This the Institute has not done.
D. State Courts: The Gap Continues
Because the saving clause permits maritime cases to be tried
in state courts, those courts are theoretically open to all the
litigation triable originally in admiralty, except for cases
involving in rein procedure to execute a maritime lien, 2
limitation of liability proceedings, actions against the United
States, action for death on the high seas, and salvage.
As a practical matter, the kinds of cases most likely to be
pursued in state courts are small cargo claims and personal
injury actions. The state court is supposed to be particularly
attractive to personal injury plaintiffs, because of the availability
of jury trial. If the amount in controversy does not exceed
$10,000, or if the parties are co-citizens, a state court is indeed
704.
119. 290 F.2d at
120. Tropicana Shipping, S.A. v. Empresa Nacional "Eleano" de la Marina
Mercante, 366 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1966).
121. Id. at 732.
122. Together with a hornbook appreciation of Swi~t. G. GI\LORI , C. BlACK.
supra note 13. at 37-38.
123. 339 U.S. at 692; see also text accompanying note 74, supra:
124. 96 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1938).
125. Id. at 82.
126. The Moses Ta~lor. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866).
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the only forum where a maritime personal injury case can today
27
be tried to a jury.
Generally, the state administration of these cases raises few
problems. The judges defer to federal decisions;' in fact it is
possible to argue that the administration of all these claims
could be left entirely to the state courts, with provisions, if
deemed necessary, for trial of diversity-plus-$10,000 cases in the
federal courts. The Supreme Court could enforce
uniformity-most of the substantive rules are pretty well worked
out by now-via certiorari, just as it does in the criminal
procedure field. There is no constitutional obligation to permit
the trial of personal injury cases in admiralty; even assuming
that the jurisdiction in 1789. included such cases, if Congress or
the Supreme Court can constitutionally enlarge the scope of
admiralty jurisdiction, presumably one or the other can likewise
diminish it.
The real federal-state admiralty rub concerns the narrow
question of death in state territorial waters.'
Because the
general maritime law affords no recovery for wrongful death,
and because the federal Death on the High Seas Act,"3 by its
terms, takes effect only beyond a marine league (three miles)
from shore, admiralty affords no remedy for wrongful death on
territorial waters. To fill this gap, the federal courts adopted a
"borrowing" theory. Admiralty, it was said, borrows the state's
wrongful death statute and makes it a part of the maritime law
as it were pro hac vice. Thus, the administrator of someone not
a seaman wrongfully killed on state territorial waters can bring
an action in the state court (with a jury), in admiralty (without a
jury), or, if diversity exists, in the federal court (with a jury).
In either of these cases, the court applies state law; unlike the usual
saving-clause case involving personal injury, cases of death in
territorial waters are not controlled by federal maritime law, un31
less the state has chosen to follow that law.:
127. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), has been omitted from this discussion,
because Jones Act cases are non-removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1964): Pate v.
Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952).
128. See Stevens. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the L ni/orm General Maritimne Law,
64 HARv. L. Ri-v. 246, 264 (1950).
129. The one and only best treatment of this difficult subject (largely written when
its author was still in law school) is D. Currie, Federalisin and the .Idttirakr: "'The
Devil's Own fess." 1960 Sup. CT. Rizv. 158.
130. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
131. See Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
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Death actions arising beyond a marine league, however, are
fully controlled by federal law. The Death on the High Seas Act
authorizes "a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty .... ,,132
Although authorities read
the statute as conferring exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction
(which, as a matter of English grammar it does, especially in
light of the absence of any such remedy before passage of the
Act), a few courts have held actions under the statute to be
:3:
subject to the saving clause.
The Institute has adopted the minority view.1 3 4 This is
unobjectionable. The state courts will continue to apply federal
substantive law, as they have for ordinary personal injury
actions. Unfortunately, however, the Institute stopped short of
the really necessary reform; indeed, it took a step backward.
Instead of explicitly extending the admiralty jurisdiction to cover
death in territorial waters, it carefully explained that the mere
fact that an injury arises on navigable waters no longer invokes
the admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, we will continue to have an
undesirable split: Administrators of deceased crew members will
be able to recover under the Jones Act, even for death in
territorial waters, but only if they can prove negligence.135 They
can also recover for unseaworthiness under the Death on the
High Seas Act, provided the fatal injury occurred over a marine
league out. :6 High seas death actions involving non-crew
members will be tried in either federal or state court, generally to
a jury, 137 with federal substantive law controlling. But the
representative of a longshoreman and of any non-crew member
killed within the three-mile limit will be remitted to the state law,
although regardless of diversity or amount, the case can be tried
3
to a jury. 8
It has always seemed the height of irrationality to say that
one standard applies if the defendant's conduct wrongfully kills a
man, and another applies if the victim is merely injured. Yet that
132. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
133. Compare. e.g.. Bergeron v. K.L.M.. 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) with
e.g.. Safir v. C.G.T., 241 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
134. ALl STUDY at 237.
135. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964)..
136. Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1962).
ajld. 317 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir.). cert. denied. 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
137. ALl STUDY at 37.
138. Id.
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is what the present law invites, since under it, the federal court
applying the state death statute must do so "cum onere," which
latinism includes differing standards of care 13 and presumably
dollar limitations. The Institute would have served its aim much
better by writing into Section 1316 a clause explicitly extending
coverage under the Death on the High Seas Act to territorial
waters and making jurisdiction concurrent. The argument that
the Institute was engaged in drafting jurisdictional legislation,
not in amending a remedial statute, does not withstand scrutiny.
By making jurisdiction concurrent in death cases arising on the
high seas, the Institute has already committed itself to amending
the Act. It should have finished the job properly, making all
death cases arising on any navigable waters triable by federal
substantive rules before a jury.
An unnecessarily complicated arrangement for death cases is
one deficiency in the Institute's treatment of the state courts'
role in the administration of maritime cases. Another is its
curious provision concerning removal of cases from the state
courts to the federal courts. Logically, the concept of removal is
designed to afford a defendant access to a federal court, despite
the in-state plaintiff's efforts to hold the litigation in the state
court system.1 °
But before a matter can be removed from a state court, it
must have been properly brought in that court. The federal
court's jurisdiction over removed cases is wholly derivative: if the
state court is without jurisdiction, so too, is the federal court.'
The Institute's proposal in part abandons both logic and
principle. It permits removal of maritime disputes when an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. This merely
declares present law;'12 there can be no serious objection. But
section 1317(b) authorizes either plaintiff or defendant, at any
time, to remove to the district court an action within the
exclusive federal maritime jurisdiction."1 If plaintiff commences
a limitation of liability proceeding, or an action against the
139. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
140. See generallY IA J. MOORE. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ' 0.15717], at 26263 (2d ed. 1965).
141. C. WRIGHT. FEDERAL COURTS 112 (1963).
142. IA J. MOORE. MOORF'S FEDERAL PRACTICE * 0.16713.-3], at 945 (2d ed.
1965).
143. Allowing a plaintiff the right of removal reverts to an abandoned experiment.
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United States, or any kind of in rein proceeding, all of them
actions over which the state courts ordinarily do not have
jurisdiction, not merely the defendant, but the plaintiff himself,
may remove. Because by definition none of these actions may
properly be brought in state courts, the Institute's proposal
would abolish the present derivative-jurisdiction rule. If that were
the only change, the section would not require comment. But the
statute goes considerably farther.
Of the three exclusive-yet-removable classes, the statute
works the least change with respect to claims against the
government. These can and should be tried in federal court.
However, the statute would permit an action to be commenced in
the state court (which cannot be done at present) and then
removed by the plaintiJ-theparty responsible for the improper
choice of courts. Why should the United States be liable to suit
in any court but that which Congress has specified in the
legislation authorizing suits in the first place? "
At most, however, this is basically an argument of
sovereign's convenience; perhaps we ought not to worry too
much about it. The same might be said concerning the alteration
the revision would cause in the presently existing scheme of
limitation. The statute and Rules'45 are geared to a federal-court
proceeding, but there seems to be no reason why the action could
not be commenced in a state court (if the state court were willing
to entertain it) and then removed to the federal court. In many
limitation situations, state courts today are permitted to
adjudicate cases falling within the Limitation Act. 4 ,
The proposal for treatment of state-commenced in reni
proceedings, however, seriously affects a hitherto settled doctrine
of admiralty law. For a century, the federal courts have insisted
that no state may afford in ren admiralty relief." 7 Any state
court seeking to enforce a state-created maritime lien by means
"During the period from 1875 to 1887 the statute governing removals, 18 Stat. 470
specifically gave to 'either party' to the suit the privilege of removal." Shamrock Oil &
Gas Co. v. Sheets. 313 U.S. 100. 104-05 (1941).
144. 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 782 (1964).
145. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964); FHii. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rule l-.
146. Ex Parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932); Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S.
147 (1957): Petition of Trawler Weymouth, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1963).
147. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866).
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of a state-created in ren procedure would be obliged "to dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction."' 4
The lack of jurisdiction may or may not be of constitutional
proportions; for present purposes, it does not matter. Assuming
that the lack of jurisdiction is merely statutory-that is, that an
in rein state proceeding is not one of those "common law
remedies" saved to suitors, and hence is reserved to the federal
courts simply by the language of the jurisdictional statute "
(either the original Judiciary Act " " or the revision151)-the Institute
has nonetheless hoist itself by its own legislative petard. In one
section it codifies the federally-exclusive nature of in rein
proceedings, whether "arising under the general maritime law or
to enforce maritime liens given by an Act of Congress or by a
statute of a state.' ' 52 If this intends, as it does, to follow the
line that the courts have developed in construing the saving
clause,' 53 then section 1317(b) controverts its purpose; it permits
a state not merely to create a maritime lien, but to enforce it as
well.
Section 1317(b) has other faults. (I) By permitting the
plaintiff to effect removal, it enables him to make use of any
divergent state in rein procedure and still, as I have just indicated,
avoid dismissal of his improperly-brought action. (2) By not
setting a time limit for removal, it distinguishes, without
apparent justification, a class of admiralty cases from any other
"civil action or proceeding," which (a) may be removed only by
the defendant and (b) cannot be removed later than thirty days
after the defendant receives a pleading indicating that the case is
in fact removable. "" (By treating some admiralty cases as
something other than "civil action(s) or proceeding(s)," the
Institute invites more of the verbal confusion which I have
discussed earlier.155 ) (3) By allowing removal at the plaintiff's
pleasure, the statute encourages the knowledgeable maritime
lawyer representing a potential plaintiff to gamble, if he believes
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 431.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 77.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
ALl STUDY at 34.
Id.
Compare28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1964) with ALl STtim at 35.
See text accompanying notes 55-66 supra.
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state procedure more favorable to his client; he commences his in
reri action in the state court, running it as far as he can until his
perhaps less-sophisticated opponent wakes up. Then he merely
removes to the district court and continues without losing a
figurative stroke.
The statute text nowhere indicates that the privilege of
removal ever expires, or that it has any connection with the bona
fides of the plaintiff's attorney. Originally, the section explicitly
permitted removal "at any time."' '6 Elimination of that phrase,
without replacement, has only emphasized the problem; if the
Institute meant to make section 1316(b) subject to the
requirements of the general removal statute 157 it should have
inserted specific language to that effect. The text of section
1316(b) likewise does not limit itself to mistaken (as opposed to
intentional) mis-commencement. The appended Note (but not the
Commentary) indicates that the section applies "if the action is
mistakenly brought in a state court." The statute, however,
which is the authority, contains no such limitation. At the
Institute's Annual Meeting in May 1968, it was suggested from
the floor that explicit language be inserted to avoid confusion.
The Reporters replied that such a change would in practice
require a court to conduct an impossibily difficult investigation
of scienter. Inasmuch as section 1386(a) (3), dealing with the
raising of jurisdictional issues, refers to "conscious concealment
of a known jurisdictional defect, '1 5 8 the apprehension of
difficulty appears either unsubstantial or inconsistent.
E. Juries: Who Has the Right?
Existing rules on availability of a federal jury right in
maritime cases are indeed "fortuitous and irrational.' 9
That Congress could rationalize the problem, none can
doubt. There does not seem to be any constitutional right to trial
by jury in maritime matters. The available evidence indicates
that at the time the Constitution was framed, admiralty matters
were judge-tried by choice and convenience, rather than on
156. ALl. STUDY OI- Till DivisioN OF JURISiC-TION BvrWHN STATE AND FIDERAI
COLRTS. Ti-NTATIVI. DRAIT No. 6, 20 (1968).
157. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-50 (1964).
158. ALI STUDY at 64-65.
159. Id. at 250.
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principle. State experience with juries in admiralty had uniformly
resulted in a return to the pre-Revolutionary practice."" While
venerating the jury as an institution, the current legal temper
seemed willing to exempt maritime matters from the jury
requirement. Thus the Massachusetts Constitution (1780), in
preserving the jury right generally, added: "and this method of
procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the
high seas, and such as relate to mariners' wages, the legislature
shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it.," '
The Institute's decision to enlarge the jury right seems wise
in principle, but in application as fortuitous and irrational as the
system it seeks to replace. It denies the jury right in any but in
personamn actions for personal injury or death. Why stop there?
The argument that "one cannot contemplate with equanimity the
trial of [collision] cases before a common-law jury"' l' does not
persuade. Civil antitrust and assorted disaster cases (air or land)
produce evidentiary quagmires considerably more complex than
the ordinary collision case; yet they are regularly jury-tried.'6"
Moreover, section 1319 will still allow a jury in any collision-injury case not involving limitation. The other argument
against affording a jury right is simply that it is not needed,
because maritime litigants in non-injury situations are happy
without a jury. " ' The general contentment with a judge trial,
however, is not a reason for denying the jury right entirely.
Those litigants who do not desire juries will continue to waive
them; those who request them should be entitled to have them.
So long as the Institute is restating the jury-admiralty
relation, and permitting juries in injury and death cases, it is not
clear why limitation cases, and maintenance cases not involving
personal injury (as for sickness) should not be jury-tried.
Although the order of proof is somewhat altered, the issues in a
160. C. U BBI,(oi-. Tin , ICI.c-ADI)IRALTY
RI.\OILtTION 200-01 (1960).
161. MASS. CONST. art. XV (1780).
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162. Currie. The Silver Oar and, Ill Thai:, I Sttdv ol te Romero Case.27 U. 0iii.
L. Rivv. I,60 n.329 (1959). The reporters originalls proposed that the jury right extend
even to actions in rem, ALl SrLI)D. Ti-\TArisi )RAIT No. 6, 22. a disposition which one
court has suggested is permissible even under existing la%%.Ilaskins v. Point Towing
Co., 395 IF.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1968).
163. See 1967 DIR. AI'i. Oi. U.S. COLRTS. \"\,, Ri i,at 237-38 and 1968 DIR.
Aoi.O.I. U.S. COURTS. ANN. Ri:p. at 234 for numerous examples of lengthy jury trials.
164. Currie, supra note 162, at 60.
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limitation proceeding are well-adapted to jury trial. Such
familiar questions as negligence, agency (called "privity" in the
limitation context), causation, and damages are jury-tried in
other contexts all the time. What policy justifies trying a 50death air crash to a jury, but a two-death motorboat explosion
to a judge? Similarly, the typical maintenance-for-sickness case
projects issues well within a jury's competence: Did the seaman
become ill in the service of the vessel? When did he reach
maximum medical benefits? The latter inquiry, indeed, plays a
part in ever"I maintenance case, including those which the Institute
proposal would allow the jury to determine. I tend to favor jury
trial of all injury, death, or maintenance cases; I only argue now
that however such cases are to be tried, the same trier ought
to determine all of them.
The Institute's proposal seems vulnerable on another point
of logic. It permits the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, to
demand a jury. Now the unspoken assumption in any effort to
enlarge the jury right in personal injury cases is that the effort
favors plaintiffs, rather than defendants. Generally the
assumption is valid, and plaintiffs will be the chief beneficiaries
of an expanded jury right. But what of the situation which may
develop in a clogged-docket district, where a jury-waived case
will reach trial months, perhaps even years, earlier than it would
if it were on the jury list?" Plaintiffs in those circumstances
frequently opt for juryless trials. The Jones Act specifically
preserves to the plaintiff the election to proceed in admiralty! "
Suppose a seaman, relying on the Act,commences an admiralty
action, only to find the defendant claiming a jury under section
1319.How is the district court to effectuate the policy of
encouraging the plaintiff's choice? How, for that matter, is the
court to reconcile the policy of the Jones Act with the policy of
section 1319?
A final weakness in the jury provision lies in the effect it
will have on the business of the district courts. The commentary
165. 1968 DiR. AD\i. O.r.. U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. at 236 shows that the median
interval from issue to trial in non-jury cases was ten months; in jury trials, fifteen months.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania the respective figures were one month and 40
months,. Oddly enough, in the Southern District of New York, the figures were 37
months and 36 months.
166. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) and 38(e) prserve the right of
any maritime plaintiff to a non-jury trial. Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring
Corp., 281 1-.Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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cites the estimate of an anonymous federal judge "with much
experience in these matters

. . .

that 95% of the cases in which a

right to trial by jury is given by this section are presently triable
to a jury.' 6 7 If his Honor meant "presently triable to a jury in a
federal court," I believe he may have overlooked the following
classes of cases, all of which are now not so triable, but which
would be heard by a jury under the Institute disposition: all
actions under the Death on the High Seas Act; all actions under
state death statutes where the parties are co-citizens; all actions
for maritime personal injury (except seamen's actions),
regardless of the amount in controversy-the passenger slip-andfall cases, for example; all actions for maritime personal injury
between co-citizens-as motorboat accidents not involving
limitations. That seems a large block of jury trials to be
throwing into the federal courts. Moreover, the Institute, in
another part of its Revision, 6 abolished federal diversity
jurisdiction over suits commenced by in-state plaintiffs. Thus
local longshoremen, if they want juries, would have to g6 to the
state courts, were it not for section 13 19, which completely
restores diversity jurisdiction as to them. This section not only
restores jurisdiction, but substantially enlarges it, since absent the
Study, longshoremen with claims for less than the jurisdictional
amount (the large majority of such actions, if Bostonian
experience is at all typical) could never obtain federal juries at all.
Because most of them want juries, they generally bring their
actions in the state courts at present, rather than in juryless
admiralty. Section 13 19 can be expected to change that process,
and hence put even more jury cases onto federal dockets.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The maritime laws and statutes of the United States are in
such a confused state that rationalization and restatement are
desperately needed. Analytically and historically, a revision of
the federal jurisdictional statutes offers an ideal arena for
completion of this essential task. Under all the circumstances of
167. ALI

STUDY at 254.
168. Id. at 12.
169. In criticizing this aspect of Section 1319, i am, once again, not urging either the
broadening or the retracting of the jury right. One ought here to note, however, that the
Institute's proposal if enacted would permit the plaintiff in any personal injury action
both to sue the defendant wherever he can find him (Section 1318), in contrast with the
strict venue requirements for non-admiralty cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964), and to have
a jury.
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its production, the American Law Institute's Study has let
admiralty down badly. Incomplete in its jurisdictional
definitions; unjustifiably casual in assessing the effect of the 1966
rules unification; inadequate in its treatment of the federal-state
relation; and unnecessarily inconsistent in its resolution of the
jury question, the Study leaves all the pre-existing admiralty
questions at best only partly answered, at worst made more
difficult.

